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A General Framework for Updating Belief
Distributions
P.G. Bissiri, C.C. Holmes & S.G. Walker ∗
Abstract
We propose a framework for general Bayesian inference. We argue that
a valid update of a prior belief distribution to a posterior can be made for pa-
rameters which are connected to observations through a loss function rather
than the traditional likelihood function, which is recovered under the special
case of using self information loss.
Modern application areas make it is increasingly challenging for Bayesians
to attempt to model the true data generating mechanism. Moreover, when the
object of interest is low dimensional, such as a mean or median, it is cum-
bersome to have to achieve this via a complete model for the whole data
distribution. More importantly, there are settings where the parameter of
interest does not directly index a family of density functions and thus the
Bayesian approach to learning about such parameters is currently regarded
as problematic.
Our proposed framework uses loss-functions to connect information in
the data to functionals of interest. The updating of beliefs then follows from
a decision theoretic approach involving cumulative loss functions. Impor-
tantly, the procedure coincides with Bayesian updating when a true likeli-
hood is known, yet provides coherent subjective inference in much more
general settings. Connections to other inference frameworks are highlighted.
Keywords: Bayesian updating; PAC-Bayes, Decision theory; Generalized es-
timating equations; Gibbs posteriors; Information; Loss function; Maximum
entropy; Self–information loss function.
1. Introduction. Data sets are increasing in size and modelling environ-
ments are becoming more complex. This presents opportunities for Bayesian
statistics but also major challenges, perhaps the greatest of which is the re-
quirement to define the true sampling distribution, or likelihood, for the data
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generator f0(x), regardless of the study objective. Even if the task is infer-
ence for a low-dimensional statistic of the population, Bayesian analysis is
required to model the complete data distribution and, moreover, assume that
the model is “true”.
In this paper we present a coherent procedure for general Bayesian infer-
ence which is based on the updating of a prior belief distribution to a posterior
when the parameter of interest is connected to observations via a loss func-
tion. Briefly here, and in the simplest scenario, suppose interest is in the θ
minimizing the expected loss
L(θ) =
∫
l(θ, x) dF0(x), (1)
for some loss function l(θ, x), e.g. l(θ, x) = |θ−x| for estimating a median,
where F0(x) is the unknown distribution function from which i.i.d. obser-
vations arise. If pi(θ) represents prior beliefs about this θ, and x is observed
from F0, then we argue that a valid and coherent update of pi(·) is to the
posterior pi(·|x), where
pi(θ|x) ∝ exp{−l(θ, x)}pi(θ). (2)
The argument for this is given later in the paper, and to some extent relies on
the idea that such an update must exist. For we have a well defined parameter
of interest θ, an initial belief distribution about the location of the parameter,
pi(θ), and gain further information about θ via x coming from F0(x). Up-
dating beliefs is mandatory and it is obvious for some function ψ we must
have
pi(θ|x) = ψ(l(θ, x), pi(θ)).
That the form for ψ is (2) is detailed later and a coherence property plays a
key role:
ψ
(
l(θ, x2), ψ(l(θ, x1), pi(θ))
)
= ψ
(
l(θ, x1) + l(θ, x2), pi(θ)
)
. (3)
This ensures we end up with pi(θ|x1, x2) as the same object whether we
update with (x1, x2) together or one after the other.
A special case is when it is known that F0(x) = F (x; θ0) for some para-
metric family of distributions F (·; θ), with corresponding density function
f(·; θ), and l(θ, x) = − log f(x; θ). For minimizing L(θ) here yields θ0 and
the update (2) is the usual Bayesian update. It is important to note that our
general update using loss functions should not to be seen as an approxima-
tion to anything; rather, it is targeting the parameter of interest, employing
the necessary loss function with a valid update of beliefs.
Classical inference based on the likelihood function can be regarded as
using the “negative log likelihood function” as a loss function; for example,
in the case of independent and identically distributed observations, we can
regard
L(θ;x1, . . . , xn) = −
n∑
i=1
log f(xi|θ)
as a loss function connecting data (xi) with a parameter θ indexing the family
of density functions f(x|θ). And in this setting, one does not even need to
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assume the correctness of the model; one is merely expressing interest in the
parameter θ0 minimizing
−
∫
log f(x; θ) dF0(x)
which is the parameter minimizing the Kullback-Leibler divergence between
the unknown f0(·) and the family f(·; θ).
1.1 The idea. Here we provide further elaboration on the outline of the
idea given previously. Let θ denote a parameter or functional of interest,
for example the mean or median of a population F0(x), and let x denote an
observation from F0(x), with F0 unknown. We are interested in a formal
way to update prior beliefs pi(θ) to posterior beliefs pi(θ|x) given x.
Bayesian inference proceeds through knowledge of a complete, true, model
for f0(x). This is often parameterised via a sampling distribution f(x; θ) and
a prior pi(θ), and define the marginal likelihood
m(x) =
∫
f(x; θ)pi(dθ).
Then, see for example Bernardo and Smith (1994), inference for θ occurs via
Bayes theorem
pi(θ|x) = f(x; θ)pi(θ)/m(x).
However, the statement “inference for θ” is meaningless unless the true para-
metric family f(·; θ) is known. In this case, following the Savage axioms
(Savage, 1954), the Bayesian update can be shown to be the rational way to
proceed. However, f0(x) may be unknown, and even if f(·; θ) is correct,
θ might be ultra high dimensional mainly made up of nuisance parameters
relative to a low dimensional subset of the parameters of interest. Taken all
together, these points can make the Bayesian approach cumbersome.
We are interested in the rational updating of beliefs under more general
and less stringent conditions. To do so we make use of loss functions to
connect information in data to parameters of interest. Informally for now, we
write such loss functions as l(θ, x), and we will discuss specific types later in
the paper. We shall consider the reporting of subjective beliefs, pi(θ|x), as an
action made under uncertainty and use decision theory to guide the optimal
action. See, for example, Hirshleifer and Riley (1992).
To outline the theory, let ν denote a probability measure on the space of θ.
We shall construct a loss function to select an optimal posterior distribution
ν̂(θ)1 given a prior pi(θ) and data x. To achieve this we construct a loss-
function L(ν;pi, x) on the space of probability measures on θ space, and
then present
ν̂ = arg min
ν
L(ν;pi, x),
as the representation of beliefs about the unknown value of θ given the prior
information, represented via the belief distribution pi, and data x. As it is
widely assumed data x is an independent piece of information to that which
1We use ν̂ to denote optimality rather than an approximation or estimate
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gave rise to the prior, it is appropriate to consider an additive, or cumulative,
loss function of the form
L(ν;pi, x) = h1(ν, x) + h2(ν, pi), (4)
where h1 and h2 are themselves loss functions on probability measures, rep-
resenting fidelity-to-data and fidelity-to-prior, respectively. See, for example,
Berger (1993) for more about ideas on uses of loss functions within decision
theory.
The question is whether we can claim a probability measure selected as
the solution to a decision problem; i.e. minimizing a loss function, can be
viewed as representing beliefs about a parameter. To answer this, given the
aim (1), we would clearly prefer probability measure ν1 to ν2 as representing
beliefs if∫ ∫
l(θ, x) dF0(x) ν1(dθ) ≤
∫ ∫
l(θ, x) dF0(x) ν2(dθ). (5)
Indeed, it would be incoherent to select ν2 rather than ν1 when (5) holds.
Thus the answer is affirmative. Though we are not minimizing or comparing
(5), since we do not have F0, we can substitute the expression
L(ν;F0) =
∫ ∫
l(θ, x)dF0(x) ν(dθ) (6)
with the Bayesian finite sample expression of the form (4). We now discuss
the choices of h1 and h2 which give (4) as a Bayesian finite sample version
of (6).
Under this approach the analyst needs to specify h1 and h2 in such a way
that they proceed in an optimal, rational, and coherent manner. Somewhat
remarkably, as proved in the Supplementary Material, for coherent infer-
ence (3), h2 must be the Kullback–Leibler divergence, Kullback and Leibler
(1951), and given by
h2(ν, pi) = dKL(ν, pi) =
∫
ν(dθ) log{ν(dθ)/pi(dθ)}.
Regarding h1, since ν(θ) is a probability measure representing beliefs about
θ, the only choice here is to take the loss-to-data h1(ν, x) on the probability
measure as the expected loss (see von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) of
l(θ, x); that is
h1(ν, x) =
∫
l(θ, x) ν(dθ),
with the particular types of the loss-function on the parameter on interest
l(θ, x) to be discussed later.
Substituting in h1 and h2, the cumulative loss function is then given by
L(ν;pi, x) =
∫
l(θ, x) ν(dθ) + dKL(ν, pi). (7)
This then; i.e. (7), is our finite sample version of (6), and note that (7) be-
comes (6) as n → ∞. The solution to (7) provides the ν̂ which the statis-
tician believes best minimizes (6). This is, according to our approach, done
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by using the empirical distribution function as a substitute for F0 and using a
penalty term which prevents the answer from being too far from the prior in
a Kullback-Leibler sense; the Kullback-Leibler appearing here for the nec-
essary coherence property of the answer. Of interest, as discussed later on,
is the PAC Bayes solution to the problem (Langford, 2005) that finds an ap-
proximation which minimizes an upper bound for (6).
Surprisingly, but quite easy to show, the minimizer of L(ν;pi, x) is given
by
ν̂(θ) = arg min
ν
L(ν;pi, x)
=
exp{−l(θ, x)}pi(θ)∫
exp{−l(θ, x)}pi(dθ) . (8)
This can be seen by observing that∫
l(θ, x) ν(dθ) + dKL(ν, pi) =
∫
ν(dθ) log
{
ν(θ)
exp(−l(θ, x))pi(θ)
}
.
So (8) has the form of a Bayesian update. As is usual in decision problems
involving the use of loss functions, it is incumbent on the decision maker to
ensure solutions exist. So l(θ, x) needs to be constructed such that
0 <
∫
exp{−l(θ, x)}pi(dθ) < +∞.
Whereas the Bayesian approach requires the construction of a probability
model for all possible outcomes conditional on all unknown states of nature,
the approach here requires the construction of loss functions given the out-
comes for only the parameter of interest. This allows the decision maker to
concentrate on modeling only those quantities that are important to the task
at hand.
1.2 Connections with related work. There is a large literature on procedures
for robustly estimating a parameter of interest by minimizing the cumulative
loss
L(θ;x) =
n∑
i=1
l(θ, xi). (9)
This is clearly the finite sample version of
L(θ) =
∫
l(θ, x) dF0(x).
Our claim is that (7) is the Bayesian version of (9), where interest is on
probability measues on θ space rather than single states θ.
Hu¨ber (2009) provides examples of (9), where we note that the primary
aim is not modeling the data but rather estimating a statistic. This is an
advantage when a probability model for the data is too hard to formulate. We
are presenting a Bayesian extension of this idea. Since we are interested in a
belief distribution for θ given data, and have further information provided by
pi, we claim the appropriate Bayesian version is given by (8).
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Some of the ideas presented in the paper have been considered in a less
general setting by Zhang (2006a, 2006b) and Jiang and Tanner (2008). In
Zhang (2006a) an estimation procedure, named Information Risk Minimiza-
tion, also known as a Gibbs posterior, which has the same form as (8), is
described in Section IV of his paper. This is our procedure when data is re-
garded as stochastic. Zhang then concentrates on the properties of the Gibbs
posterior.
Further theoretical work is done in Zhang (2006b). In Jiang and Tanner
(2008) a Gibbs posterior is studied in comparison with a true Bayesian poste-
rior where the model is assumed to be misspecified. The claim is that poste-
rior performance of a Bayesian model can be unreliable when misspecified,
whereas a Gibbs posterior which targets points of interest can have better per-
formance. The comparison involves variable selection for high-dimensional
classification problems involving a logit model.
We build on the work of Zhang (2006a, 2006b) and Jiang and Tanner
(2008) in a number of important directions. The first is that we show that the
Gibbs posterior is the only coherent, decision theoretic approach for infer-
ence and statistical applications under misspecification. We provide a princi-
pled approach to scale the relative information in the data to information in
the prior (see Section 3); that is left as an arbitrary free parameter in Zhang
(2006a, 2006b) and Jiang and Tanner (2008).
Bissiri and Walker (2010) use (7) with Bernoulli observations and find
sufficient conditions on l(θ, x) for the sequence of posteriors, based on (8),
to be consistent. This result for consistency is extended to more general i.i.d.
observations in Bissiri and Walker (2012a). In Bissiri and Walker (2012b)
it is shown that starting from the class of g-divergences, for a coherent se-
quence of updates, which will be explained later in the paper, we need the
Kullback-Leibler divergence as the loss between prior pi and ν. In this pa-
per, the Theorem presented in the Appendix, we provide a simpler and more
intuitive proof to this result by assuming a straightforward and realisitic as-
sumption about the class of g-divergences.
A similar construct to L(ν;pi, x) is provided by Zellner (1988), who
presents what is essentially a loss function for the posterior distribution us-
ing ideas of information processing from prior to posterior. The motivation
is different and relies on notions of information present in log probabilities
and log likelihoods, which may not be compatible as noted by J.M. Bernardo
in the discussion of Zellner’s paper. Furthermore, our derivation of the loss
function allows a broader interpretation of the elements, which does not re-
quire the existence of a probability distribution for the observation.
Concerns that the specification of a complete model for the data generat-
ing distribution is unachievable date back to de Finetti (1937) and the notion
of “prevision”. In his work de Finetti considers conditional expectation as
the fundamental primitive, or statistic, of interest on which prior beliefs are
expressed and updated. Recently other researchers have further developed
this approach under the field of Bayesian linear statistics, see Goldstein and
Wooff (2007).
There has been increasing awareness of the restrictive assumptions that
formal Bayesian analysis entails. Royall and Tsou (2003) describe proce-
dures for adjusting likelihood functions when the model is misspecified.
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More recently, Doucet and Shepherd (2012), and Muller (2012) consider
formal approaches to pseudo-Bayesian methods using sandwich estimators
to update subjective beliefs, motivated by robustness to model misspecifi-
cation, see also Hoff and Wakefield (2013). Ribatet et al. (2009) consider
pseudo-Bayesian approaches with composite likelihoods. More generally
there is increasing recognition that formal Bayesian analysis can be restric-
tive for example through computational issues, such as arise in the area of
Approximate Bayesian Computation (see for example Marin et al (2012)).
Several authors have considered issues with Bayesian updating by using
proxy models, f(x; θ), for example, see Key et al. (1999), when (xi) is
known not to arise from f(x; θ) for any value of θ. That is, there is no
θ conditional on which x is from f(x; θ). This is referred to as the M–open
case in Bernardo and Smith (1994). One suggested solution is to use methods
based on approximations and Key et al. (1999) describe one such idea using a
cross–validation approach. While this may be a pragmatic it does have some
shortcomings. Most serious is that there is little back–up theory and this has
repercussions in that the update suffers from a lack of coherence
Another approach is to ignore the problem. That is, assume the observa-
tions are coming from f(x; θ) even though it is known they are not. Accord-
ing to Goldstein (1981), “there is no obvious meaning for Bayesian analysis
in this case”. The disaster of making horribly wrong inference can be pro-
tected to some extent by model selection; that is, postulating a number of
models for f0(x), say fj(x; θj), with corresponding priors pij(θj), and model
probabilities (pj), for j = 1, . . . ,M . But as Key et al. (1999) point out, how
does one construct pij(θj) and pj when one knows none of the postulated
models are correct. So the Bayesian update breaks down in that nothing has
any interpretation.
Finally, and we acknowledge the contribution of the reviewers for point-
ing this out, we discuss connections with PAC Bayes; see, for example,
Shawe-Taylor and Williamson (1997), Langford (2005), Alquier (2008), McAllester
(1998), and also the approach in Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi (2006). PAC
Bayes is an interesting emerging field in machine learning concerned with
techniques for bounding the generalisation error (empirical risk) of a Bayesian
model. The motivation behind PAC Bayes is to find an upper bound for the
empirical risk of a probability measure ν on a model L(ν;F0) in (6), termed
generalisation error in the PAC Bayes literature. Given observation x and
prior pi, the upper bound will be written as U(ν;x, pi); i.e., for all ν it is that
L(ν;F0) ≤ U(ν;x, pi).
See Catoni (2003) where the form of U is provided. Then it can be shown
that an upper bound U(ν;x, pi) is provided by (8). The PAC Bayes approach
is complementary to our work. The motivation and construction is very dif-
ferent. We are interested in a framework for the rational updating of beliefs,
rather than seeking bounds on the empirical risk of a probability measure on
models. The minimizer of an upper bound is interesting but does not jus-
tify using ν̂ as an update of a belief distribution for Bayesian style inference,
and hence whether ν̂ form a coherent sequence of belief distributions is not
discussed in the PAC Bayes formulation of U . Whereas the requirement of
coherence is central to our formulation. Moreover the scaling of the loss-
7
to-data h1 to the loss-to-prior h2 enters as a constant in the margin of the
error bound in PAC Bayes whereas here it has explicit meaning in the rela-
tive weight of information provided by the two sources, prior and data (see
Section 3).
This said, there are clear synergies and the operational characteristics
of PAC Bayes are similar, they must be since we gather the same answer.
However, the motivation is different and we sincerely believe our derivation
is providing full support for the use of the posterior. Moreover, as we will see
later, this derivation provides insights into the necessary calibration of loss
functions h1 and h2.
1.3 Layout of paper. The layout of the remainder of the paper is as follows.
In Section 2 we discuss types of loss function. When the self-information
loss function is used then the update is the traditional Bayes update. With
other loss functions there is a calibration issue between the two styles of loss
function used, i.e. the loss to the data and the loss to the prior. This calibra-
tion problem is discussed and resolved in a number of ways in Section 3. In
Section 4 we discuss forms of information other than the usual data arising
from some unknown distribution function. This includes non-stochastic in-
formation and also partial information. Section 5 provides some numerical
illustrations including inference based on partial information and a clustering
problem. Section 6 concludes with a discussion on a number of points.
2. Types of loss function. In this section we will consider the form of h1
in (4) that connects information in the data to the value of the unknown θ.
We shall consider three broad situations. First, when the analyst believes
they know the complete family of distributions from which the (xi) arose,
the so called M–closed scenario. Second, when f0(x) is unknown but where
a complete likelihood f(x; θ) is being used as a proxy model. Finally, when
there is no sampling distribution or proxy model for x and the parameter of
interest is connected to x via a loss function l(θ, x).
2.1 M–closed and self-information loss. When the analyst knows the fam-
ily from which (xi) arose, the so-called M–closed view, then the Bayesian
approach to learning is fully justified, well known and widely used as a sta-
tistical approach to inference; the book of Bernardo and Smith (1994) is
comprehensive. To see how Bayes arises in our framework, we would need
to construct a loss function for l(θ, x) with the knowledge that x came from
f(x; θ). It is well known that the appropriate and sole loss function in this
case is the self–information, or logarithmic loss function, given by
l(θ, x) = − log f(x; θ).
Indeed, the cumulative loss version of this is the log-likelihood function.
See Bernardo (1979) and Merhav and Feder (1998) for more on the self
information loss function. This amounts to the use of proper scoring rules to
ensure that the analyst remains honest in expressing subjective beliefs when
the parametric family f(x; θ) is known, under which our approach coincides
with the Bayesian updating rule.
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2.2 M–open and the use of proxy models. Issues with the Bayesian rule
arise when the form of f(x; θ) is not known, for example, see Key et al.
(1999). Equivalently, there is no θ conditional on which x is from f(x; θ);
more bluntly, there is no connection between any x and any θ via f(x; θ).
This is referred to as the M–open case in Bernardo and Smith (1994). In
many situations, the correct sampling density, f0(x), is unknown or unavail-
able or too complex to work with.
One way to proceed is by considering θ0, the value of θ that minimizes
the the Kullback–Leibler divergence between a proxy model f(x; θ) and the
true density function f0(x); i.e. θ0 minimizes
dKL(f0(·), f(·; θ)) =
∫
f0(x) log{f0(x)/f(x; θ)} dx.
Then prior beliefs, pi(θ), will be expressed on this unknown value. We show
in Appendix B that it is then possible to learn about this θ0 since an infi-
nite collection of (xi) yields θ0. Then we would wish the sequence of ν(θ)
to accumulate about θ0. The appropriate loss function in this case is still
l(θ, x) = − log f(x; θ). For the standardized cumulative loss based on a
sequence of observations is given by
−n−1
n∑
i=1
log f(xi; θ)→ −
∫
log f(x; θ) dF0(x) a.s. for all θ,
which is minimized by θ0.
So while the Bayesian approach has foundational issues to deal with
whether the M–open or M–closed view hold, for the approach here it is ir-
relevant. If one adopts θ0 as the parameter value taking the family closest to
f0(·) then one does not need to worry if one is M–open or M–closed, since if
f(·; θ) is the true family then obviously θ0 reverts to the true parameter value.
This point is crucial, since for the Bayesian being in M–open or M–closed
forces one to adopt different inference approaches, see Bernardo and Smith
(1994).
Moreover our approach supports the use of the relevant partial informa-
tion in the data for updating beliefs on the parameter of interest, such as in
the proportional hazards model. This can be especially important when the
data is high dimensional. Such updates have no formal justification from a
Bayesian perspective.
2.3 Paremeter minimizing a loss function. In the most general scenario
the parameter of interest minimizes a loss function of the type (1). In the
classical literature, this type of estimation problem is in the area of Robust
Statistics and specific loss functions can be found in the literature, pertaining
to M -estimation and estimating equations. See, for example, Hu¨ber (2009).
An important class of loss functions is provided by the M estimators for
a location parameter, Hu¨ber (1964). So rather than using the loss function
− log f(xi; θ), a ρ(xi; θ) is used in an attempt to obtain robust estimation,
rather than the traditional maximum likelihood estimator, which can be sus-
pect if the model is incorrect. This idea has been generalized to the class of
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estimating equations, whereby the estimate of θ is obtained by minimizing
n∑
i=1
ρ(xi; θ).
Our approach, which mirrors this classical robust procedure, would use the
loss function
L(ν;x1, . . . , xn, pi) =
∫ n∑
i=1
ρ(xi; θ) ν(dθ) + dKL(ν, pi)
with solution provided by
ν̂(dθ) ∝ exp
{
−
n∑
i=1
ρ(xi; θ)
}
pi(dθ).
The θ0 of interest is implicitly assumed to be the limit of the sequence
of minimizers of the cumulative losses. This would be the minimizer of∫
ρ(x; θ) dF0(x) and hence the prior beliefs are being expressed about this
unknown value. Then the loss function l(θ, x) = ρ(x; θ) is ensuring the
updates are indeed “moving towards” θ0. To complete the picture, it would
have been that the decision maker would be happy to make a decision given
the minimizer of
∫
ρ(x; θ) dF0(x).
3. Calibration of relative losses. This section deals with the important
aspect of specifying the relative information in the data to the information in
the prior in general settings. In the M–closed and M–open settings the use of
the self-information loss l(θ, x) = − log f(x; θ) results in a fully specified
form for (8). However, in the setting of Section 2.3 there is an issue about
the scale of the loss function h1 which is a consequence of the apparent
arbitrariness in the weight of l(ν, x) relative to l(ν, pi), in that we are free to
multiply either by an arbitrary factor. So, equivalently, we are interested in
the loss function w l(θ, x) for some w > 0. The question is how to select w,
noting that w controls the relative weight of loss-to-data to loss-to-prior. Of
course, such an issue does not arise in the classical literature on estimation
using such loss functions since there is no combining with different styles of
loss functions. However, the calibration of different types of loss function is
not a unique problem. It arises in many applied contexts; possibly the most
well known be in health economics where losses pertaining to costs need to
be balanced against losses pertaining to health benefits.
The most common ideas for assigning w in Gibbs posteriors and PAC
Bayes typically involve cross validation and subjective choices. As men-
tioned above, in PAC Bayes the weighting w is a constant that enters into
the margin of the error bound. Here we discuss some more ideas intended to
help the analyst. We do not claim to be exhaustive in the approaches, or to
be prescriptive in advocating one approach over an other. Our intention is to
provide tools for elicitation of the relative loss-to-data to loss-to-prior.
3.1 Annealing. In the literature on Gibbs posteriors, the weighting param-
eter is labelled as a “temperature” and selected subjectively. There are clear
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connections here with the use of “power priors” (Ibrahim & Chen, 2000)
where
ν(dθ) ∝
n∏
i=1
f(xi; θ)
w pi(dθ).
Such an idea has also been discussed in Walker and Hjort (2001). It is ev-
ident what w achieves; if 0 < w < 1 then the loss-to-prior is given more
prominence than in the Bayesian update and the data will be less influential.
In the extreme case when w = 0 we retain the prior throughout. On the other
hand, when w > 1 the loss − log f(x; θ) is given more prominence than in
the Bayesian update and in the extreme case when w is very large the ν is
accumulating about the maximum likelihood estimator for the model; that is
ν(dθ) ≈ δθ̂(dθ),
where θ̂ maximizes
∏n
i=1 f(xi; θ).
3.2 Unit information loss. Here we discuss a procedure for default subjec-
tive assignment based on a prior evaluation of the expected value of l(θ, x).
The idea originates from work in the specification of reference priors and
“objective Bayes”, see for example Kass and Wasserman (1996).
To aid in the calibration of the loss functions and the selection of w we
can consider the following. To begin we need to ensure that both losses are
non-negative for all θ. Hence we write the loss function with an additional
term log pi(θ̂), which is a constant, and where θ̂ maximizes pi(θ), so that the
cumulative loss becomes
L(ν;x, pi) =
∫ [
w l(θ, x) + log{pi(θ̂)/pi(θ)}
]
ν(dθ) +
∫
ν(dθ) log ν(θ).
and we would additionally standardise l(θ, x) such that minθ l(θ, x) = 0 for
any x. If this is not the case then we replace l(θ, x) by l(θ, x) − l(θx, x)
where now θx minimizes l(θ, x). Hence, we can regard
L(θ;x, pi) = w l(θ, x) + log{pi(θ̂)/pi(θ)}
as a loss function for θ with information provided by x and pi. So, assuming
that l(θ, x) > 0, we want to calibrate the two loss functions given by
w l(θ, x) and log{pi(θ̂)/pi(θ)}.
These are two loss functions for θ and to adhere with the notion that be-
fore we have any data, there is a single piece of information, we can calibrate
the two losses by making the expected losses, taken over θ and x, to match.
That is, whether someone takes a θ and is penalized by the loss
log{pi(θ̂)/pi(θ)},
or takes a (θ, x) and is penalized by the loss wl(θ, x), at the outset, the ex-
pected losses should match. They are confronted by two choices of loss with
one piece of information and thus the losses can be calibrated by ensuring
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their expected losses coincide. The connection between expected informa-
tion and expected loss can be found in Bernardo (1979).
Thus w can be set by ensuring
wEθ,x (l(θ, x)) = Eθ
(
log{pi(θ̂)/pi(θ)}
)
.
Here E is with respect to a joint belief in x and θ; say m(x, θ), the marginal
for θ of which is pi(θ). So
w =
∫
log{pi(θ̂)/pi(θ)}pi(dθ)∫ ∫
l(θ, x)m(dθ,dx)
.
This requires specifying a sampling distribution for x, which we’ve said is
problematic, so an empirical choice is then given by
w =
∫
log{pi(θ̂)/pi(θ)}pi(dθ)∫ ∫
l(θ, x)pi(dθ) dFn(x)
.
where Fn denotes the empirical distribution function.
Let us consider an example, where l(θ, x) = (θ − x)2 with pi(θ) =
N(θ|0, τ2) with m(x|θ) being any density with mean θ and variance σ2.
Then we can evaluate∫
log{pi(θ̂)/pi(θ)}pi(dθ) = 1/2
and ∫ ∫
(θ − x)2m(dx,dθ) = σ2,
so w = σ−2/2. Hence, this calibration idea yields the “correct” value of
σ−2/2 in this case. This construction requires the user specification of a joint
density m(dx,dθ) which in some circumstances may prove difficult. One
further suggestion is to replace the prior evaluation of the expected datum-
loss with the observed unit information loss given x,∫ ∫
l(θ, x)m(dx,dθ) ≈ 1
n− p
n∑
i=1
l(θ̂x, xi) (10)
where
θ̂x = arg min
θ
n∑
i=1
l(θ, xi)
is the data-loss estimate of θ and p is the dimension of θ. For instance, in the
above example this leads to, w = σ̂−2/2 where
σ̂2 =
n∑
i=1
(xi − x¯)2/(n− 1).
It is interesting to note in the above that if it is thought the appropri-
ate choice for pi(θ) is flat, possible if the θ space is bounded, then clearly
log{pi(θ̂)/pi(θ)} = 0. Thus, to be coherent, we would equally believe ∫ l(θ, x)m(dx|θ)
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does not depend on θ, wherem(·|θ) is a belief distribution for x given θ. This
is a condition which would be hard to justify, as it would then be also for the
uniform prior for θ. If one is used, then we only recommend the value of w
is not assigned in the above way.
3.3 Hierarchical loss. Another way to proceed is to extend the loss function
to include w as an unknown parameter. Standard ideas here would suggest
we take
L(θ, w;x, pi) = w l(θ, x) + ξl(w)− log pi(θ, w)
for some ξ > 0. We would appear to be making no progress since we now
have a ξ to assign. However, this is akin to the hierarchical Bayesian model
where uncertainty is propagated via hyper-prior distributions to robustify the
ultimate prior choice at some level. Hence, the allocation of a ξ would not be
as crucial as the assignment of a w.
For example, as w is a scale parameter on loss-to-data, taking l(w) =
logw the solution is given by
ν̂(θ, w|x, pi) ∝ wξ exp{−w l(θ, x)}pi(θ, w)
and given that wξ can be absorbed in to the prior pi it is reasonable to assess
ξ subjectively. That is, it seems unreasonable to accept that pi can be chosen
subjectively but that ξ can not.
3.4 Operational characteristics and subjective calibration The idea here is
to set w so that the posterior quantiles are calibrated at some level of error to
frequentist confidence intervals based on the estimation of θ via minimizing
the loss
n∑
i=1
l(θ, xi).
So, if Cα(w, x1, . . . , xn) is the 100(1 − α)% level confidence interval for
θ, then we could select the w such that the posterior distribution of θ, with
parameter w, is such that
P(θ ∈ Cα(w, x1, . . . , xn)|x1, . . . , xn) = 1− α.
See, for example, the review article by Datta and Sweeting (2005) for refer-
ences to probability matching priors and posteriors, and Ribatet et al. (2009)
for ideas in pseudo-Bayesian approaches with composite likelihoods.
More generally we can consider the subjective setting of w where knowl-
edge of the frequentist sampling statistic of
∑n
i=1 l(θ, xi) can assist. To begin
note that w is explicitly related to the Bayes Factor quantifying the posterior
to prior odds,
log
(
pi(θ|x)
pi(θ′|x)/
pi(θ)
pi(θ′)
)
= −w[l(θ, x)− l(θ′, x)]
where w[l(θ, x)− l(θ′, x)] measures the update in beliefs in favour of θ from
θ′ on observing x. Clearly the larger the difference [l(θ, x) − l(θ′, x)] the
greater the relative evidence in favour of θ, with w determining the scale
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for unit change. It is interesting to note that should the Bayes Factor be
known for any three points {θ, θ′, x} in the joint parameter sample space,
Ωθ2 × ΩXn , then w would be fixed. The idea here is that the analyst is free
to contemplate any specific values {θ, θ′, x} for which the distribution of the
statistic S = [l(θ, x) − l(θ′, x)] may be known, and use this knowledge in
turn to help elicit a Bayes Factor therefore setting w. A concrete example
will help:
Suppose θ0 denotes the unknown mean of a population with prior pi(θ0) =
N(0, v) and loss l(θ, x) =
∑
i(θ − xi)2. Consider the design points {θ =
x¯, θ′ = 0, x} so that the statistic, S, is then
S =
∑
i
x2i −
∑
i
(x¯− xi)2
the difference in the sum of squares to the sum of squares around the mean,
and log Bayes factor
log
(
pi(θ|x)
pi(θ′|x)/
pi(θ)
pi(θ′)
)
= −wS.
The analyst is free to contemplate any value of n and any x = {x1, . . . , xn}
to help in the elicitation. Let n be chosen large and contemplate x such that
the (1 − α)% confidence interval for the unknown mean touches θ′ = 0. In
this case, for large n, we know S = F−11,n−1(1 − α), where F denotes the F
distribution. If the analyst is prepared to say how their prior beliefs would be
updated on observing x in knowledge of this symmetric CI for θ0 then the w
can be set via
w = − log(BF )/S.
We give a concrete illustration of this approach in Section 5.
3.5 Conjugate loss prior. If prior beliefs about θ can be expressed in the
form
pi(θ) ∝ exp{−λ l(θ, µ)}
for given parameters (λ, µ), then the posterior has a conjugate type property;
that is
pi(θ|x) ∝ exp{−wl(θ, x)− λl(θ, µ)}.
Thus the prior has interpretation of prior observation µ with precision λ.
Thus µ and λ would be standard objects for a Bayesian to specify. If the
prior can then be established as the equivalent of m observations, then we
obtain w via w : λ = 1 : m.
If the prior is thought not to be able to be specified in such a way, then a
good approximation to any prior can be found with choices of (M, (µj), (λj))
such that
pi(θ) ∝ exp
−
M∑
j=1
λj l(θ, µj)
 .
If we now write
pi(θ|x) ∝ exp
−w l(θ, x)− Λ
M∑
j=1
(λj/Λ) l(θ, µj)
 ,
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where Λ =
∑
1≤j≤M λj , then we see that now w : Λ = 1 : m.
Thus there is an apparent new concept here in that the experimenter is
required to think about how much information, in the form of the number of
prior observations, there is available. However, not completely new, since in
some conjugate problems there are parameters which do have the interpreta-
tion of a prior sample size; the exponential family, for example.
4. General forms of information. In this section we discuss more gen-
eral forms of information x rather than assume it arises from some unknown
F0(x). The argument is that provided l(θ, x) has been specified then an up-
date of a belief distribution about θ is available. Clearly this does not rely on
any assumption about where x came from or indeed how it became known.
In particular, we provide a definition of conditional probability when
non–stochastic information is available. This allows for posteriors to be ap-
plied in much more general settings than Bayesian models, which require a
stochastic x.
4.1 Conditional probability distributions and non-stochastic data. The
theory of conditional probability distributions is a well-established mathe-
matical theory which provides a procedure to update probabilities taking into
account new information. Such a procedure is available only if the infor-
mation which is used to update the probability concerns stochastic events;
that is, events to which a probability is pre-assigned. In other words, such
information needs to be already included into the probability model. In this
section, we shall show how the updating approach can be used to define con-
ditional probability distributions based on non–stochastic information.
Information about θ may arrive in the form of non–stochastic data; such
as if an expert declares
I = “θ is close to 0”. (11)
This type of information has been discussed by a number of authors and is
known to be problematic for the Bayesian especially when such information
arises after or during the arrival of stochastic observations (xi). We cite the
paper by Diaconis and Zabell (1982) and in particular refer the reader to
example in Section 1.1 of their paper.
We denote by I a piece of information for which no probability model for
each θ is assigned, in other words it is not and can not be determined to be
stochastic in any way. To undestand expressions such as this it is worthwhile
to recall the type of information we envisage of the type (11).
While a probability model can not connect (11) and θ, they can be con-
nected via a loss function without much difficulty. For example, l(θ, I) =
w θ2 for some w > 0 could be deemed appropriate. Note here we use I to
denote information now, replacing the stochastic x. The update ν̂(θ) based
on I and pi can then be considered as a means of defining an operational
conditional probability distribution in the presence of non-stochastic infor-
mation, given by
ν̂(θ|I) = exp{−w l(θ, I)}pi(θ)∫
exp{−w l(θ, I)}pi(dθ) .
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So, the general Bayesian approach introduced in Section 2 provides a general
definition of conditional distributions based on non-stochastic information.
For literature on paradoxes related to forcing non-stochastic events into
a probability model with a determination of all the alternatives to I we refer
the reader to Freund (1965), Gardener (1959), Bar-Hillel and Falk (1982),
and Hutchison (1999, 2008).
4.2 Partial information.
As noted in Section 2, while the parameter of interest is θ, the information
I collected may be more informative. That is, there is within I information
which does not assist with the learning about θ, for which it is possible to
identify Iθ ⊂ I which provides all the information about θ. One is therefore
interested in constructing the loss function l(θ, Iθ), leading to
ν̂(dθ) ∝ exp{−l(θ, IΘ)}pi(dθ). (12)
The partial likelihood, or partial self-information loss, used in proportional
hazards model is one such example. While Bayesian practitioners may have
adopted such a procedure in the past it would be regarded as lacking moti-
vation. On the other hand, our point is that (12) represents a valid update of
beliefs. We illustrate this approach in Section 5.
5. Illustrations. In this section we discuss the application of our approach
to important inferential problems. The first problem is one from survival
analysis where we have a well motivated proxy likelihood based on partial
information. The second example is from model-free clustering where we
have a general loss function so that calibration of w is important. A third
example, to be found in the Supplementary Material, is for joint inference on
a set of quantiles. In all cases we claim that the choice of loss function is well
founded (and unique) and that there is no traditional Bayesian interpretation
of the updates we are implementing. Yet the updates we employ do allow us
to learn about the specified parameters of interest. All of the models used to
generate results are available as open source code in R or Matlab.
5.1 Colon cancer genetic survival analysis. Colon cancer is a major world-
wide disease with increasing prevalence particularly within western societies.
Exploring the genetic contribution to variation in survival times following
incidence of the cancer may shed light into the disease eitiology and under-
lying disease heterogeneity. To this aim collaborators at the Wellcome Trust
Centre for Human Genetics, University of Oxford, obtained survival times
on 918 cancer patients with germline genotype data at 100,000’s of markers
genome-wide. For demonstration purposes we only consider one chromoso-
mal previously identified as holding a potential association signal containing
15,608 genotype measurements. The data table X then has n = 918 rows
and p = 15, 608 columns, where (X)ij ∈ {0, 1, 2} denotes the genotype of
the i’th individual at the j’th marker. Alongside this we have the correspond-
ing (n× 2) response table of survival times Y with a column of event-times,
yi1 ∈ R+ and a column of indicator variables yi2 ∈ {0, 1}, denoting whether
the event is observed or right-censored at yi1.
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To explore association between genetic variation and time-to-event we
employ a loss function derived under proportional hazards, treating the loss
to the baseline hazard as a nuisance parameter. This is based on the Cox
proportional hazard (PH) model, one of the most widely used methods in
survival analysis since its introduction in Cox (1972). In this log-linear model
the hazard rate at time t for an individual with covariate x = {x1, . . . , xp} is
defined as,
h(t|x) = h0(t) exp
 p∑
j=1
xjβj

where h0(t) is a baseline hazard function. In the seminal work of Cox (1972),
h0(t) is treated as a nuisance parameter (or process) that does not enter into
the partial-likelihood for estimating the parameters of interest β.
On the other hand, a Bayesian approach to the Cox model necessarily
involves the baseline hazard function. There is a limiting argument for the
use of the partial likelihood but this is rarely, if at all, used. Most common is
the finite partitioning of the time axis and using a piecewise constant baseline
hazard function. Though typically regarded as a nuisance parameter, the
Bayesian must specify a full probability model for it. See Ibrahim et al.
(2001), Chapter 3, for details, where they note that the proportional hazards
model is obtained under a limiting improper prior on the baseline, but it is not
known what affect this has on marginal quantities of interest such as marginal
model choice probabilities.
Using our construction we can consider only the order of events as partial-
information relevant to the regression coefficients, β, via the cumulative loss
function,
l(β,x) =
n∑
i=1
log
 exp
(∑p
j=1 xijβj
)
∑
l∈Ri exp
(∑p
j=1 xljβj
)
 , (13)
where Ri denotes the risk set, those individuals not censored or at time
ti, and in this way obtain a conditional distribution pi(β|x). We assume,
βj ∼ N(0, vj) and set vj = 0.5 for our study, reflecting beliefs that asso-
ciated coefficients will be modest; although we note that one advantage of
our approach is that subjective prior information can be integrated into the
analysis.
For evidence of effects; i.e. βj 6= 0, we can calculate the general Bayes
Factor of association at the j th marker as,
BFj =
∫
βj
exp [−l(βj |xj)]pi(βj)dβj
exp [−l(βj = 0|xj)]
which involves a one-dimensional integral that we calculate via importance
sampling.
We calculated the general Bayes Factors for each marker and in Fig (1)
we plot the log Bayes Factors over the chromosome. While there is con-
siderable variation we observe strong evidence of association around marker
10,000. It is interesting to compare the evidence of association provided by
the Bayes Factor Fig (1) in comparison to that obtained using a conventional
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Cox PH partial-likelihood based test. In Fig (2) we plot the log Bayes Fac-
tors versus − log10 p-values obtained from a likelihood ratio test. We can
see general agreement especially at the markers with strongest association as
one would expect for a large sample size. Interestingly there appears to be
greater dispersion at markers of weaker association. In Fig (3) we highlight
the region of weaker association and colour the points by the standard error
of the maximum likelihood estimate. We can see a tendency for markers with
less information, greater standard error, to get attenuated towards a logBF of
0 under the general Bayesian approach. This is further highlighted in Fig (4)
where we plot the standard error against log Bayes Factors. Markers with
high standard error relate to genotypes of rarer alleles and the attenuation
reflects a greater degree of uncertainty for association at these markers that
contain less information.
Returning to the “hit region” showing strongest association around marker
10,000, in Fig (5) we see the portion of the graph from Fig (1) containing 800
makers around the marker of strongest association. Due to high colinearity
between markers it is not clear whether the signal of association arises from a
single effect correlated with others, or from multiple independent association
signals. In order to investigate this we developed multiple marker methods.
We consider a model using potentially all 800 makers in the region and
phrase the problem as a variable selection task under a partial-likelihood
(loss), in which the user suspects that some of the p = 800 recorded co-
variates (13) may not be relevant to variation in survival times.
In the non-Bayesian paradigm, variable selection can proceed by defining
a cost function, such as AIC or BIC, that adjusts fit to the data by the number
of covariates in the model. Inference proceeds using an optimization algo-
rithm, such as forward or stepwise selection, to find a model that minimises
the cost. More recently, penalized-likelihood methods have proved popular
(Tibshirani, 1997; Fan and Li, 2002) where the partial-likelihood is max-
imised subject to some constraint on the norm of the regression coefficients
defined by some appropriate sparsity inducing metric.
Despite the enormous impact of Cox PH models and the importance of
variable selection, the Bayesian literature in this area is limited. This is be-
cause of the lack of a theoretical foundation to treat h0(t) as a nuisance pa-
rameter, leading to either ad hoc methods or the full specification of a joint
probability model. For instance, Faraggi and Simon (1998) and Volinsky
et al. (1997) adopt pseudo-Bayesian approaches. The paper of Volinsky et
al. (1997) take the BIC as an approximation to the marginal likelihood and
they use a branch and bound algorithm to find a set of models with differing
sets of covariates with high BIC scores. The difficulty here is that, while
the methods are important and well motivated, they are ultimately ad hoc.
Moreover, prior information on pi(β) does not enter into the calculation of
the BIC, meaning that an important aspect of the Bayesian approach is lost.
In contrast, Ibrahim et al. (1999) consider variable selection within a full
joint model using a prior specification of a gamma process for the baseline
hazard (see also Ibrahim et al. (2001)). This provides a formal Bayesian
solution but inference is then conditional on, and sensitive to, the specifica-
tion of the prior on h0(t), something the partial-likelihood model explicitly
avoids.
18
Here we use the partial-information relevant to the regression coefficients
β via the cumulative loss function (13). We assume proper priors, pi(β) on
the regression coefficient,
pi(βj) =
{
0 if δj = 0
N(0, vj) otherwise,
where δj ∈ {0, 1} is an indicator variable on covariate relevance with, pi(δj) =
Bin(aj) and we now treat {δ1, . . . , δ800} as a vector in a joint model. In this
way the posterior pi(δ|x) quantifies beliefs about which variables are impor-
tant to the regression. We use Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) to draw
samples approximately from pi(β, δ|x) from which the marginal distribution
on δ can be examined. In particular we make use of an efficient joint updating
proposal, q(δ′,β′|δ), within the MCMC as q(δ′,β′|δ) = q(δ′|δ)q(β′|δ′)
where q(δ′|δ) proposes a local move to add, remove, or swap one variable
per MCMC iteration in or out of the current model indexed by δ, and q(β′|δ′)
is a joint independence Metropolis update proposal, q(β′|δ′) = N(β˜δ′ , V˜δ′)
where {β˜δ′ , V˜δ′} are the MAP and approximate Information Matrix obtained
from the combination of log-partial-loss and normal prior. The joint proposal
is then accepted with probability,
α = min
{
1,
exp[−l(β′|x)]pi(β′|δ′)pi(δ′)q(β, δ|δ′)
exp[−l(β|x)]pi(β|δ)pi(δ)q(β′, δ′|δ)
}
We ran our MCMC algorithm for 100,000 iterations with prior parameter
settings, {vj = 0.5, aj = 1/800}, for all j = 1, . . . , p, equivalent to a prior
assumption of a single associated marker. In Fig (6) we show the marginal
inclusion probability, after discarding 10,000 samples as a burn in. The al-
gorithm showed an overall acceptance rate of 8% for proposed moves. The
model suggest overwhelming evidence for a single marker in the region of
index 10200 but also weaker evidence of independent signal in a couple of
other regions. R code to perform the reversible jump MCMC multiple vari-
able sampling for the Cox PH partial-likelihood with normal priors is avail-
able on request.
5.2 Bayesian model-free clustering. Cluster analysis is one of the most
widely used and important areas of modern statistics (Hastie et al 2009). In
cluster analysis a primary objective is to identify self-similar groups within
data, such that observations within a group are deemed more closely related
to one another than observations between groups. K-means clustering being
arguably the most popular clustering method in use today.
The clustering problem is interesting from a formal Bayesian perspective
as it raises a number of challenges. The object of interest is the cluster par-
tition mapping, S, that allocates observations to clusters. However the par-
tition S as it stands is not a generative model (sampling distribution for ob-
servables). To implement clustering the Bayesian analyst is forced to define
a sampling distribution for observations within a cluster, f(x|Cj), where Cj
denotes parameters associated with the jth cluster, with an associated prior
probability of cluster membership pj . This leads to the well known marginal
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mixture representation,
f(x|C) =
K∑
j=1
pjfj(x|Cj)
the canonical example being with Gaussian mixture components, f(x|Cj) =
N(µj ,Σj), which necessitates a further layer of hierarchical priors pi(µj ,Σj).
The mixture model representation to accomplish inference on S has signifi-
cant consequences. First, cluster membership can be sensitive to the choice
of sampling distribution. Secondly Bayesian mixture models suffer from the
well known label switching problem (Jasra et al 2005).
This is a good illustration of where conventional Bayesian updating is
restrictive. In cluster analysis the object of interest is typically the partition
structure, pi(S), yet the Bayesian analyst is forced to introduce an additional
level of complexity, specifying mixture components with nuisance parame-
ters and priors on nuisance parameters, {µj ,Σj}, which are of no interest,
yet affect the analysis, and define a likelihood which exhibits symmetry to
permutation of the labels.
On the other hand, non-Bayesian model-free segmentation methods have
a distant advantage in allowing the analyst to concentrate on the object of in-
terest, namely the clustering S, typically defined through the specification of
a pairwise dissimilarity score between observations d(xi, xj). An optimisa-
tion algorithm is then used to find the optimal partition Ŝ that minimises the
score over pairs within and/or between clusters. However, in this approach
there is no natural method2 to explore uncertainty, sensitivity or stability in
the reporting of Sˆ. Conventional methods of frequentist uncertainty charac-
terisation, via the bootstrap or sub-sampling, cannot be routinely applied to
model-free cluster analysis as dissimilarity scores are typically defined over
pairs of observations and we only have one realisation of the data. Some
methods propose to subsample the data and look at stability of global statis-
tics, such as the choice of the number of groups, but there is generally a lack
of theoretical understanding and justification for stability methods in cluster-
ing, and moreover such approaches cannot answer the important question of
pairwise cluster uncertainty on the joint allocation P ({xi, xj ∈ Ck}).
In Seldin and Tishby (2001), the authors use PAC Bayesian ideas to con-
sider latent cluster structure to obtain a predictor distribution Q(y|x) for out-
come y given x based on a clustering of the x. For example, x could be a set
of movies, or a set of individuals, or a vector combination of both. The loss
function to be minimized is given by
L(Q1, Q2) = β
n∑
i=1
∫
l(yi, y)Q(dy|xi)+
∫
dKL
(
Q2(c|x), Q2(c)
)
λ(dx)
where
Q(y|x) =
∫
Q1(y|c)Q2(dc|x)
2Note, we are not referring to the stability of the optimisation routine to find the global minima
but rather that there maybe many competing segmentations of the data with near equivalent scores.
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and
Q2(c) =
∫
Q2(c|x)λ(dx)
for some probability measure λ. Here c would denote a clustering of the x
and the (yi, xi) are the observed data. This minimization is non-trivial and
the setting of the coefficient scaling the information in the data can be hard
to determine, though the authors suggest a cross-validation approach.
Our setting is slightly different since we only observe (xi) and wish to
make inference on the underlying clustering of observations into groups.
Hence we define a prior distribution directly on the partition, pi(S), and a
loss function l(S, x1, . . . , xn)) and use general Bayesian updating. To illus-
trate this we consider uncertainty analysis of a classic data set considered
in Hartigan (1972), illustrated in Figure 7, in his highly influential paper
that introduced biclustering. Biclustering refers to the simultaneous cluster-
ing of observations and covariates (rows and columns) of a data matrix. It
having proved extremely useful in modern application areas, particularly in
genomics (Cheng & Church (2000), Tanay et al (2002), Heard et al (2005)).
Hartigan’s paper considered the percentage Republican presidential vote
of sixteen southern States in the US over 18 elections covering the years
1900–1968. Hartigan treated the time series as independent covariates in his
co-clustering approach. Here, for simple illustration, we maintain the time
series ordering, so that the co-clustering is akin to clustering multiple change-
point time series with common but unknown change points. We assume the
cluster memberships are constant over time, but the time series change at
specific breakpoints. Our loss function is defined as in Hartigan (1972) using
a sum of squares decomposition,
l(S, x1, . . . , xn) = w
∑
C∈S
∑
ij∈C
(xij − x¯C)2
where C denotes a grouping of States over a particular time period and x¯C
denotes the mean vote of the States and elections assigned to theC’th cluster,
and posterior distribution P (S|x) ∝ pi(S) exp{−w l(S, x)}. The setting of
the loss parameter w is a crucial part of the model specification. Following
the procedures discussed in Section 3, it’s difficult to consider a conjugate
specification or a unit information prior on the discrete structures. We instead
propose to use a frequentist calibration approach in the following manner.
Recall that under a flat prior on S we can set w via a subjective assessment
of the posterior ratio at a reference point,
P (S|x)
P (S′|x) = exp{−w[l(S, x)− l(S
′, x)]}
and where we can solve forw if all the other elements are given. In elicitation
of w we propose to make use of classical results from ANOVA. We take as
our first reference point the null partition using a single global cluster, so that
the loss l(S, x) =
∑
i
∑
j(xij − x¯)2 is simply the sum of squares around
the mean. Then consider a randomised data partition {x, S′} that allocates
the data uniformly at random to k clusters. Under this allocation scheme we
expect,
[l(S, x)− l(S′, x)]/k − 1
l(S, x)/(n− k) ∼ Fk−1,n−k
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where F denotes the F distribution. We can then use the F-distribution to
help in the calibration. For example, if we consider a point in the tails of
F such that, f∗α = F
−1
k−1,n−k(α) with α ∈ (0, 1), and specify l(S′, x) =
l(S, x)/[1+f∗(k−1)/(n−k)] then l(S′, x) represents the value of loss such
that a randomised allocation has probability 1 − α of producing a smaller
loss. Equivalently, with probability α a random allocation would lead to a
reduction in loss as high as [1 + f∗α(k − 1)/(n− k)] relative to the single
cluster. When α is large we can be confident that a partition achieving a loss
of l(S′, x) represents a significant clustering. The analyst can then calibrate
w in the following way:
• Define a reference value for R = P (S|x)/P (S′|x) under a uniform
prior, setting R small, say R = 0.001.
• Define a p-value value, α, such that should a partition S′ achieve a
relative reduction in loss of [1 + f∗α(k − 1)/(n− k)], relative to the
global partition S, then you would assign relative posterior beliefs of
R.
• Set w = − log(R)l(S, x)f∗α(k − 1)/(n− k)
For the election data we found w is quite stable to the calibration choice
of {α,R}, e.g with k = 3 we find w = 0.0036, {α = 0.99, R = 0.01} and
w = 0.0012 for {α = 0.999, R = 0.01}. We choose w = 0.0012 and ran an
MCMC algorithm for 100,000 iterations using a burn in of 50,000. The itera-
tion numbers were chosen after experimentation to deliver stable results over
multiple runs. The MCMC algorithm was re-run for differing numbers of
partitions of States and differing number of time series change points. Table
1 presents the results of the average loss achieved over each run alongside the
estimate of the posterior probability for each configuration shown in brackets
using a Poisson(3) prior on the number of groups and a Poisson(2) prior on
the number of time groupings (= kt + 1 in the table), which is the number of
change-points +1. Note that the first column in Table 1 equates to standard
clustering of the States with zero change points, whereas the first row repre-
sents a multivariate change point model. We can see from Table 1 that there
is strong evidence for clustering in both time and across States. The maxi-
mum posterior probability favours the model with 3 groups of States and 3
time groupings.
We can investigate uncertainty in the partitions and in the cluster allo-
cation of the maximal posterior model. To illustrate this we plot in Fig-
ure 8 the distribution of the location of time-series change points for the
{ks = 3, kt = 2} model. We can see strong evidence that the change
points occur late in the series, which is visually supported by the data in
Figure 7. The pairwise co-clustering probabilities of this model are shown
in Figure 9, where each element represents the pairwise probability events∑
S P (S|x)I[C(xi) = C(xj)|S], where C(xi) is the cluster index for the
i’th State. The cluster blocks show strong concordance with the single co-
cluster reported by Hartigan, see Figure 6a in Hartigan (1972). However
our method highlights considerable uncertainty in the pairing of Virginia and
North Carolina, something we’re able to quantify using our general Bayesian
approach.
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6. Discussion. We have provided a basis for general learning and the up-
dating of information using belief probability distributions. Loss functions
constructed on spaces of probability measures allow for coherent updating.
Specifically, information is connected to the parameter of interest via a loss
function and this is the fundamental concept, replacing the restrictive connec-
tion based on probability models. We can recover precisely the traditional
updating rules such as the Bayes rule when we select the self–information
loss function, when it is appropriate to do so.
The assumptions we make are minimal. That information can be con-
nected to unknown parameters via loss functions and that individuals then
act rationally by minimizing their expected loss. If information is assumed
to come from some probability model then we can accommodate this within
our framework by appealing to the self–information loss function equivalent
to the negative log-likelihood and so we can argue that loss functions are
sufficient for learning mechanisms currently in use.
More generally, we can use loss functions currently employed in a classi-
cal context for robust estimation; for example, generalized estimating equa-
tions. We can also deal appropriately with partial information where it is
only a part of some observed information is useful or relevant for learning
about the decision making process based on a particular relevant parameter
of interest.
We have developed a rigorous approach to updating beliefs where we are
required only to think about which is the best parameter from a chosen model
needed to make a decision rather than have to think about a non–existent true
model parameter which coincides with the true data generating mechanism.
We believe it is more fundamental to identify parameters of interest through
loss functions. The alternative route through a probability model is, we ar-
gue, highly restrictive and leads to narrow types of Bayesian updating. The
necessary supporting theory for us is minimal, the construction and mini-
mization of loss functions, whereas for the use of probability models is more
intricate and restrictive.
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No. change points in time kt
No. State clusters ks kt = 0 kt = 1 kt = 2
ks = 1 7.98 (-14.49) 6.82 (-14.34) 6.72 (-14.73)
ks = 2 5.36 (-13.69) 5.13 (-13.65) 3.19 (-13.58)
ks = 3 5.09 (-13.64) 3.92 (-13.38) 2.36 (-13.28)
ks = 4 4.99 (-13.91) 3.32 (-13.50) 2.02 (-13.41)
Table 1: Average loss of partitions ×104 across MCMC samples (and log pos-
terior probabilities in brackets). Average loss is T−1
∑T
i=1 l(Si, x) with Si ∼
pi(S|x, ks, kt), where ks denotes the number of clusters of States and kt denotes the
number of time series change points. Log posterior probabilities shown in brackets
using a Poisson(3) and Poisson(2) prior on the number of groups and number of
time clusters = (kt + 1). Maximum posterior clustering shown in bold.
27
Figure 1: Log Bayes Factor vrs marker index along chromosome
Figure 2: Log Bayes Factor vrs -log10 p-value of association
28
Figure 3: Log Bayes Factor vrs -log10 p-value of association coloured by standard
error in MLE
Figure 4: Standard Error in MLE vrs log Bayes Factor
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Figure 5: Log Bayes Factor vrs marker index in the “hit region”
Figure 6: Posterior marginal inclusion probability from multiple marker model
30
Figure 7: Voting of Southern States illustrating % of republican vote for presi-
dential elections every four years beginning in 1900: AL Alabama; AR Arkansas;
DE Delaware; FL Florida; GA Georgia; KY Kentucky; LA Louisiana; MD Mary-
land; MS Mississippi; MO Missouri; NC North Carolina; SC South Carolina; TN
Tennessee; TX Texas; VA Virginia; WV West Virginia.
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Figure 8: Time change point locations for model with 3 groups and 2 change-points
Figure 9: Pairwise co-clustering probabilities across 3 groups and 2 time change-
points: see Figure 7 for labels.
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